了解演讲稿文体(4篇)

第1篇 了解中国的崛起演讲稿

the world is changing with really remarkable speed. if you look at the chart at the top here, you'll see that in 2025, these goldman sachs projections suggest that the chinese economy will be almost the same size as the american economy. and if you look at the chart for 2050, it's projected that the chinese economy will be twice the size of the american economy, and the indian economy will be almost the same size as the american economy. and we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the western financial crisis.

a couple of weeks ago, i was looking at the latest projection by bnp paribas for when china will have a larger economy than the united states. goldman sachs projected 2027. the post-crisis projection is 2022. that's just a decade away. china is going to change the world in two fundamental respects. first of all, it's a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year.

and within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. never before in the modern era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a developed country. secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world -- which i think is what china will become -- will be not from the west and from very, very different civilizational roots.

now i know it's a widespread assumption in the west that, as countries modernize, they also westernize. this is an illusion. it's an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition, markets and technology. it is not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. china is not like the west, and it will not become like the west. it will remain in very fundamental respects very different. now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of china? how do we try to understand what china is? and the problem we have in the west at the moment by-and-large is that the conventional approach is that we understand it really in western terms, using western ideas. we can't. now i want to offer you three building blocks for trying to understand what china is like -- just as a beginning.

now what is e_traordinary about this is, what gives china it's sense of being china, what gives the chinese the sense of what it is to be chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation state period, which is what happened in the west, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization state. i'm thinking here, for e_ample, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like guan_i, confucian values and so on. these are all things that come from the period of the civilization state. in other words, china, unlike the western states and most countries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization, its e_istence as a civilization state, rather than as a nation state. and there's one other thing to add to this, and that is this: of course we know china's big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people. what we often aren't really aware of is the fact that china is e_tremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized. you can't run a place on this scale simply from beijing, even though we think this to be the case. it's never been the case.

so this is china, a civilization state, rather than a nation state. and what does it mean? well i think it has all sorts of profound implications. i'll give you two quick ones. the first is that the most important political value for the chinese is unity, is the maintenance of chinese civilization. you know, 2,000 years ago, europe: breakdown, the fragmentation of the holy roman empire [roman empire]. it divided, and it's remained divided ever since. china, over the same time period, went in e_actly the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization state together.

the second is maybe more prosaic, which is hong kong. do you remember the handover of hong kong by britain to china in 1997? you may remember what the chinese constitutional proposition was. one country, two systems. and i'll lay a wager that barely anyone in the west believed them. 'window dressing. when china gets it's hands on hong kong, that won't be the case.' 13 years on, the political and legal system in hong kong is as different now as it was in 1997. we were wrong. why were we wrong? we were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation state ways. think of german unification, 1990. what happened? well, basically the east was swallowed by the west. one nation, one system. that is the nation state mentality. but you can't run a country like china, a civilization state, on the basis of one civilization, one system. it doesn't work. so actually the response of china to the question of hong kong -- as it will be to the question of taiwan -- was a natural response: one civilization, many systems.

now the great advantage of this historical e_perience has been that, without the han, china could never have held together. the han identity has been the cement which has held this country together. the great disadvantage of it is that the han have a very weak conception of cultural difference. they really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are not. hence their attitude, for e_ample, to the uyghurs and to the tibetans.

or let me give you my third building block, the chinese state. now the relationship between the state and society in china is very different from that in the west. now we in the west overwhelmingly seem to think -- in these days at least -- that the authority and legitimacy of the state is a function of democracy. the problem with this proposition is that the chinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the chinese than is true with any western state. and the reason for this is because -- well, there are two reasons, i think. and it's obviously got nothing to do with democracy, because in our terms the chinese certainly don't have a democracy. and the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in china is given a very special -- it enjoys a very special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of chinese civilization, of the civilization state. this is as close as china gets to a kind of spiritual role.

and the second reason is because, whereas in europe and north america, the state's power is continuously challenged -- i mean in the european tradition, historically against the church, against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on -- for 1,000 years, the power of the chinese state has not been challenged. it's had no serious rivals. so you can see that the way in which power has been constructed in china is very different from our e_perience in western history. the result, by the way, is that the chinese have a very different view of the state. whereas we tend to view it as an intruder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the chinese don't see the state like that at all. the chinese view the state as an intimate -- not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family -- not just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. this is the chinese view of the state -- very, very different to ours. it's embedded in society in a different kind of way to what is the case in the west.

and i would suggest to you that actually what we are dealing with here, in the chinese conte_t, is a new kind of paradigm, which is different from anything we've had to think about in the past. know that china believes in the market and the state. i mean, adam smith, already writing in the late 18th century said, 'the chinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in europe.' and, apart from the mao period, that has remained more-or-less the case ever since. but this is combined with an e_tremely strong and ubiquitous state. the state is everywhere in china. i mean, it's leading firms, many of them are still publicly owned. private firms, however large they are, like lenovo, depend in many ways on state patronage. targets for the economy and so on are set by the state. and the state, of course, its authority flows into lots of other areas -- as we are familiar with -- with something like the the one-child policy.

moreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old tradition of statecraft. i mean, if you want an illustration of this, the great wall is one. but this is another, this is the grand canal, which was constructed in the first instance in the fifth century b.c. and was finally completed in the seventh century a.d. it went for 1,114 miles, linking beijing with hangzhou and shanghai. so there's a long history of e_traordinary state infrastructural projects in china, which i suppose helps us to e_plain what we see today, which is something like the three gorges dam and many other e_pressions of state competence within china. so there we have three building blocks for trying to to understand the difference that is china -- the civilization state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relationship to society.

and yet we still insist, by-and-large, in thinking that we can understand china by simply drawing on western e_perience, looking at it through western eyes, using western concepts. if you want to know why we unerringly seem to get china wrong -- our predictions about what's going to happen to china are incorrect -- this is the reason. unfortunately i think, i have to say that i think attitude towards china is that of a kind of little westerner mentality. it's kind of arrogant. it's arrogant in the sense that we think that we are best, and therefore we have the universal measure. and secondly, it's ignorant. we refuse to really address the issue of difference. you know, there's a very interesting passage in a book by paul cohen, the american historian. and paul cohen argues that the west thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures. but it's not. in many ways, it's the most parochial, because for 200 years, the west has been so dominant in the world that it's not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations. because, at the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way. whereas those cultures -- virtually the rest of the world, in fact -- which have been in a far weaker position, vis-a-vis the west, have been thereby forced to understand the west, because of the west's presence in those societies. and therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolitan in many ways than the west.

i mean, take the question of east asia. east asia: japan, korea, china, etc. -- a third of the world's population lives there, now the largest economic region in the world. and i'll tell you now, that east asianers, people from east asia, are far more knowledgeable about the west than the west is about east asia. now this point is very germane, i'm afraid, to the present. because what's happening? back to that chart at the beginning -- the goldman sachs chart. what is happening is that, very rapidly in historical terms, the world is being driven and shaped, not by the old developed countries, but by the developing world. we've seen this in terms of the g20 -- usurping very rapidly the position of the g7, or the g8. and there are two consequences of this. first, the west is rapidly losing its influence in the world. there was a dramatic illustration of this actually a year ago -- copenhagen, climate change conference. europe was not at the final negotiating table. when did that last happen? i would wager it was probably about 200 years ago. and that is what is going to happen in the future.

and the second implication is that the world will inevitably, as a consequence, become increasingly unfamiliar to us, because it'll be shaped by cultures and e_periences and histories that we are not really familiar with, or conversant with. and at last, i'm afraid -- take europe, america is slightly different -- but europeans by and large, i have to say, are ignorant, are unaware about the way the world is changing. some people -- i've got an english friend in china, and he said, 'the continent is sleepwalking into oblivion.' well, maybe that's true, maybe that's an e_aggeration. but there's another problem which goes along with this -- that europe is increasingly out of touch with the world -- and that is a sort of loss of a sense of the future. i mean, europe once, of course, once commanded the future in it's confidence. take the 19th century for e_ample. but this, alas, is no longer true.

okay, so how would i like to finish? well, what should our attitude be towards this world that we see very rapidly developing before us? i think there will be good things about it and there will be bad things about it. but i want to argue, above all, a big picture positive for this world. for 200 years, the world was essentially governed by a fragment of the human population. that's what europe and north america represented. the arrival of countries like china and india -- between them 38 percent of the world's population -- and others like indonesia and brazil and so on, represent the most important single act of democratization in the last 200 years. civilizations and cultures, which had been ignored, which had no voice, which were not listened to, which were not known about, will have a different sort of representation in this world. as humanists, we must welcome, surely, this transformation. and we will have to learn about these civilizations.

this big ship here was the one sailed in by zheng he in the early 15th century on his great voyages around the south china sea, the east china sea and across the indian ocean to east africa. the little boat in front of it was the one in which, 80 years later, christopher columbus crossed the atlantic. (laughter) or, look carefully at this silk scroll made by zhuzhou in 1368. i think they're playing golf. christ, the chinese even invented golf.

welcome to the future. thank you.

第2篇 了解名人三分钟演讲稿

了解名人三分钟演讲稿篇一

卡米卢

公元前365

古罗马战将，政治家。公元前396年起五度出任执政官。曾率军抗击高卢人入侵，攻克德尔斐城，为扩大罗马疆域，立下显赫战功。公元前388年，面对惨遭高卢人劫掠的罗马城和沸沸扬扬要求迁徒的民情，卡米卢在元老院发表了这篇文理交融、声情并茂的演说。他用天意，用古训，用史实，用乡情，用罗马城的地利，阐述了反对迁徒的理由。一连串的设间、反问和排比，使演说层层推进，产生了不凡的气势。结果，罗马人决定重建家园，卡米卢因而也被尊为罗马城的“再生之父”。

反对迁往维爱 公元前388年

同胞们哪!同平民保民官的争辩对我是如此地痛苦，以至当我居住在阿底亚的整个时日里，我在痛苦的流放中唯一的慰籍就是我远远地躲开了这些冲突。如只就这些冲突而论，即使你们用一千道元老院的命令和人民的票决来把我吕还，我也决不回来。现在我回来了，这不是由于在我这方面改变了主意，而是由于你们的命运的变化才迫使我回来的。当前的问题是我的祖国究竟是否应当安然不动地留在原地，而不是我是否要不顾任何代价留在我的祖国。如果我不是在为我的祖国进行另一次战斗，即使现在我也乐于保持沉默，一言不发。只要一息尚存，不对祖国克尽厥责，对其他人就是一种耻辱，对卡米卢更是一种莫大罪行。如果当现在祖国已经光复时，我们抛弃了她，那我们为什么要把她赢回来呢?为什么要在她被敌人包围时把她从敌人的手中解救出来呢?当高卢人获得胜利并占有了整个罗马时，罗马的神明和人民仍然坚守着神殿和城寨，仍然居住在那里。而现在当罗马人获得了胜利并收复了罗马时，难道反要放弃城寨和神殿吗?难道我们的幸远要比我们的厄运还要使罗马遭受到更大的荒凉吗?即使在罗马城建立时没有制定宗教制度且一代一代地相传下去，但是上大的意旨在此次事变中已经如此清楚地显示出来，最少我个人相信，一切忽视神圣崇拜的思想都已经从人们的生活中排除了。

同胞们哪!当你们看到因崇拜或漠视神明而在人事中产生了这样重大的后果时，你们还没理解到，当我们还没有完全由我们从前的罪过和堕落所引起的毁灭中挣脱出来时，我们是又在策划着多么深重的罪行吗?我们的罗马城是在通过占卜和兆象而显示出的神的意旨之下建立起来的;罗马城中没有一块地方不满是宗教的联系，没有一块地方没有一位神明存在;一切正规的祭祀，正如它们都有指定的日期一样，也都有指定

的地点。同胞们，你们要抛弃所有这些神——这些由国家崇敬的神和你们在自己的祭坛上供奉的每个神祗吗?你们的行为比起光荣的青年盖约·费边在围困时的行为来相去多远呢?当他从城寨上下来，穿过高卢人的枪林箭雨，在奎里那尔山上举行了他的家族的规定的祭祀时，连敌人都同你们一样敬佩地注视着他。当家族的神圣仪礼甚至在战争时期都不曾间断，难道你们竟愿意看到在和平时期放弃国家的宗教礼制和罗马的神明吗?难道能让大司祭们和佛拉门们对他们的公共职能比私人对自己家庭的宗教义务还要不加重视吗?

有人可能会回答说，我们可以或者在维爱履行这些义务，或者派祭司到这里来履行。但是，如果要依礼完成这些仪式。这两种办法都急做不到的。不用一-一列举每个仪典和神明，我只要问：在朱霹特神的节日大宴时，除了在神殿内，我们又能在其他什么地方铺设他的卧塌呢?①我又何必谈起维斯塔神的不灭的神火和安全地保存在她的神庙中的作为我们国统保证的神像呢?②而你，玛尔斯神哪!和你，父神奎利努啊!又何必谈起你们的神盾呢?③你们的愿望是要把所有这些与罗马同寿的，甚至有些是更古老的神圣之物都抛弃在污渎的土地上吗?

祭司们又如何呢?你们难道不了解，这将要犯一种多么重大的罪过吗?因为，维斯塔贞女们一定只有一个住所，除了罗马城的陷落，从来没有任何事物曾使她们离开那里。朱霹特神的佛拉门由神法规定，不能在罗马城外留过一宿。你们要使这些神职人员变成维爱的祭司而不再是罗马的祭司吗?维斯塔神哪!您的贞女们要抛弃您吗?佛拉门要因他每夜寄居在外而给他自己和国家带来新的罪恶吗?想一想我们在正式占卜吉凶后几乎完全在罗马境内进行的其他活动吧!对它们，我们是想要如何地弃置不顾和疏忽漠视啊!授予最高统帅权的库里亚大会，你们选举执政官和军政官的百人团大会——除了在经常召开它们的地点，又能在哪里日开它们并占卜吉凶呢?我们将把这些都迁到维爱去吗?或者在需要召开大会时，人们在罗马城已被神和人抛弃之后再非常不便地到这里来开会吗?

但你们会说，显然整个罗马是被亵读了，没有任何拔除的祭祀能够使它洁净，形势本身迫使我们离开被火摧毁、一切化为废墟的罗马，而迁往一切完整的维爱。我们不应该建设罗马使赤贫的平民为在这里重建家园而受苦。但同胞们啊!我想，不用我说，你们就很明白，这个说法只是一个动听的托词，而不是一个真正的理由。你们记得，迁往维爱的这同一个问题是怎样在高卢人到来前就被提出

过的，而那时公私建筑和罗马城都还安然屹立着。并且，保民官们，请你们注意：我的观点和你们的观点是多么的不同。你们认为，即使在那时不应该搬迁，无论如何现在就应该搬迁了，然而——在你们听懂我要说的意思之前，请不要表示惊讶——我的意见却是，即使在罗马完整无缺时迁徙是对的话，那么，现在我们也不应放弃这片废墟。因为，在那时，如果迁往一个被我们坟陷的城市，其理由在于，对我们自己和我们的子孙后代，这都显得是光彩的胜利，但现在这种迁徒将是对高卢人的光荣，对我们的羞辱和痛苦。因为，我们将被认为，不是作为胜利者离开了我们的祖国，而是因为被征服而失掉了祖国。人们会认为，这是阿里亚的逃溃，罗马的失陷和神殿的被围等等迫使我们抛弃我们的家神，注定我们自己要从我们无力保卫的地方流亡出去。难道高卢人能颠覆罗马，而罗马人竟不能恢复罗马吗?

难道因为建设有困难， 你们就准备容许这个罪恶和忍受这个耻辱吗?如果说，在整个罗马城中，不能建起比我们的祖国的建者的茅屋更好更宽敞的住处，难道在我们的神庙和神祗之间，象牧人农夫那样居住在茅屋中，不比作为一个流亡的民族而迂徙外地更好吗?我们的祖先——牧人和难民，④在几年之间就创立了一个新的城邦，那时这里除了丛林和沼泽外，别无他物;难道我们竟不管城寨与神殿的依旧完整，各神庙的仍然屹立，而逃避重建被烧毁的建筑的责任吗?如果我们的房屋烧了，我们每人会如何为自己来努力呢?现在是罗马城被烧毁

了，我们作为一个整体，难道就不想作同样的努力吗?

再说，假定或出于恶意，或出于偶然，维爱发生了大火，而火焰被风煽扬(这是很可能的)，烧毁了城市的大部，那我们是不是又要去注意腓德耐或盖比爱，或任何其他你们能想到的城市，作为迁往的地方呢?我们的乡土，这块我们称之为祖国的土地，对我们就只有这样微弱的吸引力吗?我们对祖国的热爱，就只是依恋它的建筑吗?虽然回忆我的苦难是不愉快的，回亿你们不公正的行为是更不愉快的，但我必须向你们承认，每当我在外地怀念我的祖国时，所有这一切——山丘、平原、台伯河、这片对我如此亲切的景物、这片我生长于其下的天空——都立刻涌上我的心头。我深望这一切所激起的眷恋之情现在能够打动你们，使你们留在你们的祖国，而不要在你们放弃她之后，让这一切引起你们的故国之恩而使你们怀念不已。神和人选定这块地方作为一个城邦的所在，不是没有正当的理由的。这里有振奋精神的山丘;有宽阔的河流，通过这

条河流，内陆各地的物产可以运来，海外各地的货品也可取得;这里临近大海，可以获得海洋所能提供的一切好处，但又不太近海，不致遭受外国舰队的威胁;这里又是正位于意大利中心的地区——总之，这是天然的适合于一个城邦扩展的位置。一个城邦立国不久，其疆域已如此之大，仅仅这一点，就说明了这个道理。同胞们，今年是罗马建城的第365年。然而在你们长期与之作战的所有那些古老国家中，不必提单独的城邦了，只讲同爱奎依人相联合的伏尔西人以及他们的所有工事坚固的城镇和雄视海陆、横贯意大利东西海岸的整个埃特鲁里亚——他们在战争中都未能成为你们的对手。你们命运亨通，迄今一直是如此;又有什么理由叫你们尝试另一种命运呢?打消这种想法吧!即使承认你们的勇敢能够转移到另一个地方去，这块土地的好运肯定是不会转移过去的。这里有喀必多林山，它是从前曾经发现一个人头的所在，这被认为是一个预兆，预示这里将是世界首领和最高权力的所在。就是在这里，当喀必多林山由占卜的仪式予以清除时，朱维塔斯神和德尔米努神⑤不肯被人移动，这曾经使你们的祖先欢喜不已。维斯塔的神火就在这里;天降的神盾就在这里;所有的神明都在这里，如果你们留下来，他们将向你们降福。

注释：

①罗马每年9月13日在朱霹特神殿举行大祭，朱霹特神像置一卧榻上。

②在维斯塔女神的神庙中由维斯塔贞女维持着国灶中的不灭的神火，它是罗马公民的象征，是罗马国统的保证。

③玛尔斯神和奎利努神都是罗马的战神。据说在罗马第二王努玛统治的时期。由天上降下了战神的神盾，这被认为是罗马国家永远存在的象征，由战神的祭司们悉心保存。

④传说罗马创建者罗慕洛是维斯塔贞女与战神所生。国王(也是他的叔父)下令处死其母，将罗慕洛掷在台伯河中，但他未死，并受到牧人的抚养，因此这里说他是牧人和难民。

⑤朱维塔斯神是罗马神话中的青年文神，有两个神庙，一个神庙在喀必多林山上。德尔米努神是罗马神话中主管疆界的神，他的形象是一个人头，没有手脚，表示他决不离开他所在的地方，朱霹特神殿中亦有德尔米努神的一个地位，因此有时他被解释为朱霹特神的一种表现。

了解名人三分钟演讲稿篇二

亲爱的同学们大家晚上好! 当有人站在这么一个舞台上，我们很多同学都会羡慕。也会想，也许我去讲，会比他讲的更好。但是不管站在台上的同学是面对失败还是最后的成功，他已经站在这个舞台上了。而你，还只是一个旁观者，这里面的核心元素，不是你能不能演讲，不是你有没有演讲才能，而是你敢不敢站在这个舞台上来。我们一生有多少事情是因为我们不敢所以没有去做的。

曾经有这么一个男孩，在大学整整四年没有谈过一次恋爱，没有参加过一次学生会班级的干部竞选活动。这个男孩是谁呢?他就是我。

在大学的时候，难道我不想谈恋爱吗?那为什么没有呢?因为我首先就把自己看扁了。我在想，如果我去追一个女生，这个女生可能会说，你这头猪，居然敢追我，真是癞蛤蟆想吃天鹅肉。要真出现这种情况，我除了上吊和挖个地洞跳进去，我还能干什么呢?所以这种害怕阻挡了我所有本来应该在大学发生的各种感情上的美好。 其实现在想来，这是一件多么可笑的事情，你怎么知道就没有喜欢猪的女生呢?就算你被女生拒绝了，那又怎么样呢?这个世界会因为这件事情就改变了吗?那种把自己看得太高的人我们说他狂妄，但是一个自卑的人，一定比一个狂妄的人还要更加糟糕。因为狂妄的人也许还能抓到他生活中本来不是他的机会，但是自卑的人永远会失去本来就属于他的机会。因为自卑，所以你就会害怕，你害怕失败，你害怕别人的眼光，你会觉得周围的人全是抱着讽刺打击侮辱你的眼神在看你，因此你不敢去做。所以你用一个本来不应该贬低自己的元素贬低自己，使你失去了勇气，这个世界上的所有的门，都被关上了。

当我从北大辞职出来以后，作为一个北大的快要成为教授的老师，马上换成穿着破军大衣，拎着浆糊桶，专门到北大里面去贴小广告的人，我刚开始内心充满了恐惧，我想这可都是我的学生啊，果不其然学生就过来了。哎俞老师，你在这贴广告啊。我说，是，我从北大出去自己办个培训班，自己贴广告。学生说，俞老师别着急，我来帮你贴，我突然发现，原来学生并没有用一种贬低的眼神在看我，学生只是说，俞老师我来帮你贴，而且说，我不光帮你贴，我还在这看着，不让别人给它盖上。逐渐我就意识到了，这个世界上，只有你克服了恐惧，不在乎别人的眼光，你才能成长。 也正是有了这样慢慢不断增加的勇气，我有了自己的事业，有了自己的生活，有了自己的未来。

回过头来再想一想，最近这几天正在全世界非常火爆的我的朋友之一马云，他就比我伟大很多。马云跟我有很多相似之处，当然不是长相上相似，大家都知道，这个长相上还是有差距的，他长得比较有特色。

我们俩都高考考了三年，我考进了北大的本科，他考进了杭州师范学院的专科，大家马上发现，从这个意义上来说，无论如何，我应该显得比他更加的优秀。但是一个人的优秀并不是因为你考上了北大就优秀了，并不是因为你上了哈佛就优秀了，也并不会因为你长相好看而优秀。一个人真正优秀的特质来自于内心想要变得更加优秀的那种强烈的渴望，和对生命的追求那种火热的激情。马云身上这两条全部存在。 ，

如果说在我们那个时候，马云能成功，李彦宏能成功，马化腾能成功，俞敏洪能成功，我们这些人都是来自普通家庭，今天的你拥有的资源和信息比我们那个时候要更加丰富一百倍，你没有理由不成功。 当我们要有勇气跨出第一步的时候，我们首先要克服内心的恐惧，因为这个世界上，只有你往前走的脚步你自己能够听见。 所以我希望同学们能够认真地想一下：我内心现在拥有什么样的恐惧，我内心现在拥有什么样的害怕，我是不是太在意别人的眼光，因为这些东西，我的生命质量是不是受到影响，因为这些东西，我不敢迈出我生命的第一步，以至于我生命之路再也走不远。如果是这样的话，请同学们勇敢地对你们的恐惧和勇敢地对别人的眼神，说一声no!because i am myself.

了解名人三分钟演讲稿篇三

约公元前495——公元前429

古雅典政治家、战略家，出身名门，24岁从政，善于思辨。受哲学家阿那克萨哥拉民主思想的影响，推崇奴隶主民主政治。公元前444年当选将军，连续20__年执掌军权，成为雅典的实际统治者。当政期间，对内推行和完善奴隶主民主制，废除任职财产资格限制，鼓励工商业和文化发展;对外与波斯言和，加强提洛同盟，维护雅典海上利益，使雅典进入鼎盛时期，成为“希腊的学校”。为称雄希腊地区，公元前431年率兵迎战斯巴达，史称“伯罗奔尼撒战争”。初期互有胜负，但战局发展对雅典不利。公元前430年在攻讦声中落选将军，并被课以巨额罚金。次年再度当选。不料瘟疫席卷雅典，染疾而终。本葛是为悼念在伯罗奔尼撒战争中阵亡的将士而作，被认为是描述雅典奴隶主民主政治的范文。通篇说理缜密，讲求词藻，刻意铺陈，以繁茂取胜，反映了当时诡辩学派修辞家的影响。

论雅典之所以伟大 公元前431年

我们为有这样的政体而感到喜悦。我们不羡慕邻国的法律，因为我们的政体是其他国家的楷模，而且是雅典的独创。我们这个政体叫做民主政体。

①它不是为少数人，而是为全

① 即奴隶主民主制。体人民。

②无论能力大小，人人都享有法律所保障的普遍平

② “全体人民”实际上指奴隶主和自由民，不包括奴隶在内。

等，并在成绩卓著时得享功名，担任公职的权利不属于哪个家族，而是贤者方可为之。家境贫寒不成其为障碍。无论何人，只要为祖国效力，都可以不受阻碍地从默默无闻到步步荣升。我们可以畅通无阻地从一个职位走向另一个职位;我们无所顾忌地共享亲密无间的日常生活;我们既不会为邻人的我行我素而烦恼，也不全面露不豫之色—— 这有伤和气，却无补于事。这祥，我们一方面自由而善意地与人交往，另一方面又不敢以任何理由触犯公益，因为我们遵从法庭和法律，特别是那些保护受害者的法律，以及那些虽未成文，但违反了即为耻辱的法律。另外，为了陶冶身心，我国法律还规定了十分频繁的节假日。赛会和祭祀终年不断。届时美不胜收，蔚为大观，欢愉的气氛驱散了忧郁。我们的雅典如此伟大，致使宇内各地的产品云集于此。这些精美产品和国内产品一样，给雅典人带来了习以为常的乐趣。我们在军事政策上也胜过敌人，我们的方针与敌人的方针截然不同。雅典向世界敞开大门。我们并不担心敌人会窥得那些从不隐藏的秘密，使我们蒙受损失，也从不以此为由

，把前来寻求进步和猎奇的外国人驱逐出境。比较而言，我们不大依靠战备和谋略，而是信赖公民们与生俱来的爱国热忱和行动。在教育方面，某些国家的人从小就簧接受严酷的训练，以便在成年后承受辛劳;我们雅典人的生活尽管温文尔雅，却能象他们一样勇敢地面对任何战争危险。在生活方式上，我们既文雅，又简朴，既培育着哲理，又

不至于削弱思考。我们以乐善好施而非自我吹嘘来显本自己的富有，承认贫困并不可耻，无力摆脱贫困才确实可耻。我们既关心个人事务，又关心国家大事;即便那些为生活而奔忙的人，也不乏足够的参政能力。因为唯独雅典人才认为，不参与国事乃平庸之辈，而不止是懒汉。我们能作出最准确的判断，并善于捕捉事情的隐患。我们不认为言论会妨碍行动，而认为在未经辩论并充分作好准备之前，不应贸然行动。这是雅典人与众不同的优点：行动时我们勇气百倍，行动前却要就各项措施的利弊展开辩论。有些人的勇气来自无知，深息熟虑后却成了懦夫。毫无疑问，那些深知战争的灾患与和平的甜美，因而能临危不惧的人，才称得上具有最伟大的灵魂。我们在行善方面也与众多的民族不同。我们不是靠接受承诺，而是靠承担义务来维护友谊。根据感恩图报之常理，施惠人对受惠人拥有优势;后者由于欠了前者的情，不得不扮演比较乏味的角色，他觉得报答之举不过是一种偿还，而不是一项义务。只有雅典人才极度乐善好施，但不是出于私利，而是纯属慷慨。综述未尽之言，我只想加上一句：我们雅典总的来说是希腊的学校，我们之中的每一个人都具备了完美的素质，都有资格走向沸腾的生活的各个方面，都有最优雅的言行举止和最迅速的办事作风。

至于你们这些幸存者，你们可以为改善命运而祈祷，但也应把保持这种英勇抗敌的精神和激情视为己任。不要仅凭高谈阔论来判定这样做的利弊。因为每一个夸夸其谈的人，都能把众所周知的道理和奋勇抗敌的益处诉说一遍。你们要把祖国日益壮大的景象系在心上，并为之着迷。等你们真正领悟到了雅典的伟大，你们再扪心自问，雅典之伟大乃是由那些刚毅不拔，深知己任，在战斗中时刻有着荣誉感的将士们缔造的。一但他们的努力不能成功，需要他们以大无畏气概来报效祖国，他们不认为这是耻辱，因而作出了最崇高的奉献。他们就这样为国捐躯了。他们中的每个人都将千古流芳。他们的陵墓将永放光华，因为这不仅是安葬英灵的墓穴，而且是铭刻英名的丰碑。无论何时，只要谈到荣誉或实践荣誉，人们就会提到他们，他们永垂不朽。

第3篇 演讲要征服听众就要先了解演讲者与听众

演讲要征服听众就要先了解演讲者与听众

下面从两方面谈谈演讲者与听众的关系及演讲者如何征服听众。

一、了解和掌握听众

为什么要了解和掌握听众呢？这是因为：

第一，听众是演讲活动不可缺少的重要方面。演讲是演讲者与听众的双向交流活动。演讲者是信息的传播者，听众是信息的接受者。演讲者离开了听众就失去了对象，演讲活动就无法进行。

第二，了解和掌握听众是实现演讲目的的客观要求。演讲的目的是说服听众改变态度并按照演讲者的意图去行动。这就要求演讲者的意图去行动。这就要求演讲者了解听众的心理、要求和希望及对你所讲观点的态度，这样你才能有的放矢地作好演讲。

第三，听众在演讲活动中虽处于客体的地位，但也绝不是被动的“接收器”，而是具有主观能动性的积极参与者。如果听众对演讲内容有极大兴趣，便会采取积极、热情的合作态度；反之，则会采取冷漠甚至敌视的态度，演讲就不会成功，因此，演讲者必须在了解听众的基础上力求触发听众的兴奋点和创造欲，才能实现的最终目的。

可见，成功的演讲者既要使演讲成为听众的一部分，也要使听众成为他的演讲的一部分，而其中首要的，要便是要了解和掌握听众的心理特点。总的说来，听众的心理主要有以下四个特点：

1，听众对信息的接受具有选择性。听众听演讲是用听觉、视觉器官及大脑进行认识的.一种综合心理活动，它是在已有经验、知识和心理期待的基础上进行的，因而具有极强的主观色彩和选择性。首先是选择性注意，即只注意那些他们已知、有兴趣、有关系或渴望了解的部分；其次是选择性记忆，即容易记住那些自己愿意记住的信息，忘记那些自己不喜欢的信息；再次是选择性接受，即愿意接受那些与自己一致的观点。

2，听众对演讲的态度受自身的影响。对同一演讲者的同一内容，听众由于受自身态度的影响采取不同的态度。

3，听众都有特殊的心理需要。每个听众听演讲的心理需要都与切身利益相关。有希望长知识的，有希望开眼界的，有希望解决实际总是的等。

4，听众心理是独立意识与从众心理的矛盾统一。即是说听众心理既有个个独立思考、不唯上、不唯书的独立意识的一面；又有受其他听众影响改变自己看法的一面。

二、演讲者的威信效应

演讲者的威信是指演讲者在听众中享有的声望与信誉，这是演讲者趋于成熟的重要标志。那么，威信效应会对听众产生哪些积极的心理作用呢？

第一、对听众态度的影响。如果演讲者在听众中有较高的威信，听众往往会由喜爱演讲者的人格而喜爱演讲者的人格而喜爱演讲内容；有时即使演讲内容他们并不熟悉和有兴趣，也易受威信效应的影响报以热情合作的态度。

第二、对听众认知心理的影响。社会心理学研究表明，人们对于来自权威方面的信息，一般都易不加分析地加以接受。因为演讲者的威信，听众往往会认为他的话都是权威、可信的，这就使演讲者宣传的观点容易和听众相抵触。

第三、对听众情感心理的影响。威信效应的最大作用就是对听众情感的影响。演讲者的威信使听众的好奇和期待心理满足了，他们就会对演讲者产生一种归属感、亲近感，便会带着兴奋的听演讲。

演讲者的掌握了以上四个心理特征的基础上，便可以从以下几方面做起，树立自己在听众中的威信。

首先要摆正和听众的关系。要牢记：演讲者也是人民的一员，和听众在政治地位、人格上是平等的，没有高低贵贱之分，只是暂时的社会分工、社会义务不同，因此，要以平等、谦和的姿态作演讲，既宣传听众，又向听众学习。

其次要发挥“名片效应”和“自己人效应”。所谓“名片效应”，就是演讲者先申述一种与听众观点相同的观点，然后再说出演讲者想说的观点，这就很容易被听众接受。它可以淡化甚至消除听众在一种观点认同的喜悦中自动解除精神防线。

“自己人效应”则比“名片效应”更进了一层，即演讲者与听众不仅在观点上一致，而且有某种意义的相似性，如性别、年龄、籍贯、职业、地位、经历、兴趣等，都会使听众产生信任感、亲近感，视演讲者为“自己人”。有了这些，还愁你的威信树立不起来吗

第4篇 演讲要征服听众要先了解演讲者与听众

下面从两方面谈谈演讲者与听众的关系及演讲者如何征服听众。

一、了解和掌握听众

为什么要了解和掌握听众呢？这是因为：

第一，听众是演讲活动不可缺少的重要方面。演讲是演讲者与听众的双向交流活动。演讲者是信息的传播者，听众是信息的接受者。演讲者离开了听众就失去了对象，演讲活动就无法进行。

第二，了解和掌握听众是实现演讲目的的客观要求。演讲的目的是说服听众改变态度并按照演讲者的意图去行动。这就要求演讲者的意图去行动。这就要求演讲者了解听众的心理、要求和希望及对你所讲观点的态度，这样你才能有的放矢地作好演讲。

第三，听众在演讲活动中虽处于客体的地位，但也绝不是被动的“接收器”，而是具有主观能动性的积极参与者。如果听众对演讲内容有极大兴趣，便会采取积极、热情的合作态度；反之，则会采取冷漠甚至敌视的态度，演讲就不会成功，因此，演讲者必须在了解听众的基础上力求触发听众的兴奋点和创造欲，才能实现的最终目的。

可见，成功的演讲者既要使演讲成为听众的一部分，也要使听众成为他的演讲的一部分，而其中首要的，要便是要了解和掌握听众的心理特点。总的说来，听众的心理主要有以下四个特点：

1，听众对信息的接受具有选择性。听众听演讲是用听觉、视觉器官及大脑进行认识的一种综合心理活动，它是在已有经验、知识和心理期待的基础上进行的，因而具有极强的主观色彩和选择性。首先是选择性注意，即只注意那些他们已知、有兴趣、有关系或渴望了解的部分；其次是选择性记忆，即容易记住那些自己愿意记住的信息，忘记那些自己不喜欢的信息；再次是选择性接受，即愿意接受那些与自己一致的观点。

2，听众对演讲的态度受自身的影响。对同一演讲者的同一内容，听众由于受自身态度的影响采取不同的态度。

3，听众都有特殊的心理需要。每个听众听演讲的心理需要都与切身利益相关。有希望长知识的，有希望开眼界的，有希望解决实际总是的等。

4，听众心理是独立意识与从众心理的矛盾统一。即是说听众心理既有个个独立思考、不唯上、不唯书的独立意识的一面；又有受其他听众影响改变自己看法的一面。

了解听众的心理需求可通过以下方法：1，通过你的听众所在单位的领导；2，通过某一地区、时期的社会舆论；3，通过开小型座谈会或与听众个别交谈；4，通过演讲过程中的提问、插话等。

二、演讲者的威信效应

演讲者的威信是指演讲者在听众中享有的声望与信誉，这是演讲者趋于成熟的重要标志。那么，威信效应会对听众产生哪些积极的心理作用呢？

第一、对听众态度的影响。如果演讲者在听众中有较高的威信，听众往往会由喜爱演讲者的人格而喜爱演讲者的人格而喜爱演讲内容；有时即使演讲内容他们并不熟悉和有兴趣，也易受威信效应的影响报以热情合作的态度。

第二、对听众认知心理的影响。社会心理学研究表明，人们对于来自权威方面的信息，一般都易不加分析地加以接受。因为演讲者的威信，听众往往会认为他的话都是权威、可信的，这就使演讲者宣传的观点容易和听众相抵触。

第三、对听众情感心理的影响。威信效应的最大作用就是对听众情感的影响。演讲者的威信使听众的好奇和期待心理满足了，他们就会对演讲者产生一种归属感、亲近感，便会带着兴奋的听演讲。

演讲者的掌握了以上四个心理特征的基础上，便可以从以下几方面做起，树立自己在听众中的威信。

首先要摆正和听众的关系。要牢记：演讲者也是人民的一员，和听众在政治地位、人格上是平等的，没有高低贵贱之分，只是暂时的社会分工、社会义务不同，因此，要以平等、谦和的姿态作演讲，既宣传听众，又向听众学习。

其次要发挥“名片效应”和“自己人效应”。所谓“名片效应”，就是演讲者先申述一种与听众观点相同的观点，然后再说出演讲者想说的观点，这就很容易被听众接受。它可以淡化甚至消除听众在一种观点认同的喜悦中自动解除精神防线。

“自己人效应”则比“名片效应”更进了一层，即演讲者与听众不仅在观点上一致，而且有某种意义的相似性，如性别、年龄、籍贯、职业、地位、经历、兴趣等，都会使听众产生信任感、亲近感，视演讲者为“自己人”。有了这些，还愁你的威信树立不起来吗